_The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church by Heinrich Schmid, D.D. Third edition, revised Translated from German and Latin by Charles A. Hay, D.D. and Henry E. Jacobs, D.D. Copyright 1875 and 1889, Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs Copyright 1899, Henry E. Jacobs and Charles E. Hay Reprinted 1961 by Augsburg Publishing House_ Pages 293-407 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CHAPTER II. OF THE FRATERNAL REDEMPTION BY CHRIST, AS THE SECOND SOURCE OF SALVATION. PARA. 31. Statement of the Subject. The redemption designed by God from eternity was accom- plished in time by His only begotten Son, Jesus Christ, [1] and of this we are now to treat. The subject will be dis- cussed under three heads: I. The Person of the Redeemer. II. The Work by which He accomplished Redemption. III. The severeal States in which He appeared from the time of His incarnation. [1] HOLL. (650): "The Redeemer of the human race is Jesus Christ. The Redeemer is called Jesus, i.e., Saviour, because He was to save His people from their sins, Matt. 1:21." (655): "He is called Christ, i.e., anointed, because He was anointed by the Holy Ghost as our king, priest, and prophet, John 1:41." The Dogmaticians prove that Jesus Christ is the true Messiah, in whom all the prophecies of the Old Testament concerning the Messiah are exactly fulfilled. HOLL. (675): "Proof. (1) Whoever is God and man is the true Messiah. But Jesus, etc. The major premise is evident from 2 Sam 7:12, 13; Ps. 110:1; Micah 5:1; Jer. 23:5 ... (2) Whoever was born of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Judah, of the royal branch of David, and of a pure virgin, is the true Messiah. The major premise, from Gen. 22:18; 49:10; 2 Sam. 7:12; Is. 5:14. The minor, from Luke 3:23; 1:34. (3) Whatever ruler of Israel, as God, was begotten from eternity, and as man was born in the fulness of time at Bethlehem, is the true Messiah. The major premise, from Micah 5:2. The minor, from Matt. 2:6.... (4) He is the true Messiah, for whose approach a divinely-appointed herald prepared the way. The major, from Is. 40:3; Mal. 3:1. The minor, from Mark 1:2, 3.... (5) Whatever king of Zion entered Jerusalem poor and humble, riding upon an ass, is the true Messiah, Zach. 9:9....(5) Whoever is the Goel, or Redeemer, according to the law of consanguinity, Job 19:25; the prophet like Moses, Deut. 13:15; a universal king, Zach. 9:9; Ps. 72:8; a priest according to the order of Melchize- ----------------------End of Page 293----------------------------- dek, Ps. 110:4; a priest interceding for sinners, Is. 53:12; who is to pass through the extremity of suffering, Ps. 22; Is. 53; who is to die, Dan. 9:26; who is to be buried, Is. 53:9; who is to be free from corruption; to descend to the dead and to rise again, Ps. 16:10; to ascend to heaven, Ps. 68:18; to sit at the right hand of God the Father, Ps. 110:1, is the promised Messiah. All these things the New Testament declare of Jesus of Nazareth." A.--OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST. PARA. 32. Of the Personal Union. In Christ the Redeemer we recognize a duality of natures and a unity of person, as expressed in the statement: "In Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, are two natures, a divine, that of the Word (ho logos), and a human nature, so united that Christ is one person." (CHMN., Loc. Th., I, 75.) We are to treat, there- fore, in succession, first, of the two natures in Christ, and sec- ondly, of the person of Christ. I. Of the Two Natures in Christ.--Christ is God and man. This is otherwise thus expressed: He exists in two natures, the divine and the human. [1] The divine nature He has of God the Father, and from eternity; the human nature He assumed in time from the Virgin Mary. [2] Each of these natures is to be regarded as truly genuine and entire, [3] for Christ is true God and true man. [4] As true man He par- ticipates in all the natural weaknesses to which human nature is subject since the Fall--He participates therein, however, not in consequence of a natural necessity, but in consequence of His own free will, for the accomplishment of His mediatorial work; for, as He was born of a human being, the Virgin Mary, but not begotten of a human father, His human nature did not inherit any of the consequences of Adam's sin. [5] This does not prevent us from ascribing to Christ a true, complete human nature, like our own, as this is, indeed, predicated of Adam when not yet fallen, inasmuch as original sin, that we have inherited in consequence of the sin of Adam, has not given man another nature. It does, however, follow from the peculiar circumstances connected with the birth of Christ, and from the peculiar relation which the divine logos sustains to this human nature, that certain peculiarities must be predi- ---------------------End of Page 294----------------------- cated of the human nature of Christ which distinguish it from that of other men. These are (1) the anupostasia [i.e., want of personality]; (2) the anamartesia [i.e., sinlessness]; (3) the sin- gularis animae et corporis excellentia [i.e., the peculiar excellence of soul and body.] [6] The first results from the peculiar relation which the divine logos entered into with the human nature; for this latter is not to be regarded as at any time subsisting by itself and constituting a person by itself, since the logos did not assume a human person, but only a human nature. Therefore there is negatively predicated of the human nature the anupostasia, inasmuch as the human nature has no personality of its own; and there is positively predicated of it the enupostasia, inasmuch as this human nature has become pos- sessed of another hypostasis, that of the divine nature. The anamartesia (sinlessness) is expressly taught in many passsages of the Scriptures (2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 7:26; Is. 53:9; Dan. 9:24; Luke 1:35; 1 Peter 1:19; 2:22), and follows also from the supernatural birth of Christ. The singular excellence of soul and body is a consequence of His sinlessness. II. Of the Person Of Christ.--The person of the Redeemer is constituted, when the logos, the Second Person of the Godhead, the Son of God, unites Himself with human nature, and this so firmly and intimately that the two natures now united con- stitute One Person, which is that of the Redeemer, the God- man. [7] The act itself by which this is accomplished is called unitio personalis. HOLL. (665): "The divine action by which the Son of God assumed human nature, in the womb of the Virgin Mary, into the unity of His own person." [8] This act is chosen and determined upon by the entire holy Trinity, by whom the substance that constitutes the human nature is prepared, and by whom this is united with the divine nature; but this act is accomplished in the second person of the Godhead, who alone has become man. [9] This Second Person of the Godhead, the logos, in the act of uniting holds such a relation to the human nature that He, the logos, imparts the personality, [10] and is in general the efficient agent through which the union is accomplished; for it is He that sustains an active relation to the human nature, which He assumes, whilst the human nature stands in a passive relation -----------------------End of Page 295--------------------------- to Him. [11] This firm union of the divine and human natures, regarded as a condition, is then called unio personalis seu hypostatica [i.e., personal or hypostatic union]. HOLL. (679): "The personal union is a conjunction of the two natures, divine and human, subsisting in one hypostasis of the Son of God, producing a mutual and an indissoluble communion of both natures." [12] And the result of this activity of the logos is, that the hypostasis of the divine nature now has become also the hypostasis of the human nature, i.e., both natures have now one hypostasis, that of the logos, and together form one person, that of the Redeemer, the God-man. [13] In conse- quence thereof the union of the two natures is so close and inseparable [14] that the one can no longer be conceived of as without or away from the other, but both are to be regarded as in all respects united, [15] yet in such a way that each of the two natures in this union retains its own essential charac- ter and peculiarities as before, and remains unmingled with the other. [16] So the Scriptures teach. But it is impossible to form a correct conception of the way and manner in which these two natures are united in the One Person, because the Scriptures teach us only the union itself, and not the mode in which it is effected. We shall have to content ourselves, therefore, with guarding against false conceptions that might be entertained in regard to this union. [17] Accordingly, we say that the union is "(1) not an essential one, by which two natures coalesce in one essence (against the Eutychians); (2) not a natural one, such as that of the soul and body in man; (3) not an accidental one, such as (a) between two or more dif- ferent qualities united in one subject (as whiteness and sweet- ness are united in milk); (b) between a quality and a substance (as we find in a learned man); (3) between two substances that are accidentally united (as between beams that happen to be fastened togetther); (4) not a merely verbal one, arising either from a sinecure title (as when a man is called a counselor of his sovereign, which title was never bestowed upon him be- cause of counsels he had given) or from the use of figurative language (as when Herod is called a fox); finally, (4) not an habitual or relative one, which may exist, although the parties to this union may be separated and far apart. (There are ----------------------End of Page 296------------------------------ many varieties of this relative union, such as moral, between friends; domestic, between husband and wife; political, between citizens; ecclesiastical, between members of the Church.)" [18] HOLL. (679). On the other hand, we may predicate of this union, positively, that "(1) It is true and real, because it exists between extremes that really adhere, there being no separation or distance be- tween them; "(2) It is a personal one (but not a union of persons), and interpenetrative (perichoristica);* "(3) It is a perpetually enduring one." (See Notes 6, 7, 8.) [1] HFRFFR. (260): "By the natures, the two sources or parts, so to speak, are understood, of which the person of Christ has been constituted, namely, a Divine nature and a human nature." Of Person it is remarked: "The Person of our Redeemer is here con- sidered, not as asarkos, or such as it was from eternity before the incarnation, but as ensarkos, or such as it began to be in the fulness of time, through the taking of our human nature into His own divine person." (HOLL., 656.) General Definition of Nature and Person. CHMN. (de duab. nat., 10: "Essence, or substance, or nature, is that which of itself is com- mon to many individuals of the same species, and which embraces the entire essential perfection of each of them." "Person or individual is something peculiar, possessing indeed the entire and perfect substance of the same species, but deter- mined and limited by a characteristic and personal peculiarity, and thus subsists of itself, separated or distinguished from the other individuals of the same species, not in essence, but in num- ber. For a person is an indivisible, intelligent, incommunicable substance, which neither is a part of another, nor is sustained in another, nor has dependence upon another object such as the sep- arated soul has upon the body that is to be raised up. Therefore, the names of the essence or natures are theotes, anthropotes, divinity, humanity, divine nature, human nature, divine essence, human substance. The designations of the person are God, man." Concerning the difference of signification, in which the term nature or essence is employed with reference to God and to man, cf. chapter, "Of the Holy Trinity," note 14, p.141. QUEN. (Of the Divine Nature of Christ (III, 75)): "The divine nature otherwise signifies the divine essence, one in number, com- -------------------------------------------------------------------- *Perichoristica. See PARA. 33, Note 2. ---------------------End of Page 297----------------------------------- mon to all three Persons, and entire in each; but, in the article `Of the Person of Christ,' this is not considered absolutely, in so far as it is common to the three persons of the Godhead, but relatively, so far as it subsists in the person of the Son of God, and, as by the manner of its exstence, it is limited to the Second Person of the Trinity. Whence it is true that the entire divine essence is united to human nature, but only in one of its persons, viz., the second." [2] QUEN. (III, 75): "The incarnate Person consists of two natures, divine and human. The divine nature He possesses from eternity, from God the Father, through eternal, true, and properly named generation of substance; whence Christ is also the true, nat- ural, and eternal God, the Son of God. A true and pure human nature He received in time, of the Virgin Mary." A twofold generation is, therefore, distingished in Christ: one "an eternal generation, through which He is the Son of God;" and another, "a generation in time through which He is man, or the Son of man. Gal. 4:4." (Br., 457.) [3] HOLL. (659): "The Council of Chalcedon: `We confess that He is true God and true man, the latter consisting of a rational soul and a body, co-essential with the Father according to the God- head, and co-essential with us according to the manhood, in all things like unto us, sin only excepted.'" SCHRZR. (177): "The antithesis of the Eutychians, who indeed admit two natures prior to the act of union, but affirm that from that time the human nature has been altogether absorbed by the Godhead." QUEN. (III, 75): "With regard to the human nature we must consider: 1, its truth; 2, its completeness; 3, its homoousia (identity of essence). The first excludes a mere appearance; the second, incompleteness; the third, contrariety of essence (eterousia)." GRH. (III, 373): "In Christ there is a true and perfect divine nature, and hence Christ is also true, natural, and eternal God. We say that in Christ there are not only divine gifts, but also a true and perfect divine nature; nor do we simply say that He is and is called God, but that He is true, natural, and eternal God, in order, by this means, to separate our confession the more distinctly from the blasphemies of the Photinians, and all opponents of the divine nature." (Id. III, 400): "In Christ there is a true, complete, and perfect human nature, and for this reason Christ is also true, perfect, and natural man. By truth of human nature is meant that the Word took upon Himself not an appearance, or mere outward form of human nature, but in reality became a man. By completeness of ---------------------End of Page 298------------------------------ human nature is meant that He took, into the unity of His person, all the essential parts of human nature, not only a body, but also a rational soul; since His flesh was flesh pervaded by soul. Nor is it said only that He was, but that He still is, a man: because He never has laid aside, nor ever will lay aside, what He has once assumed." These expressions are directed against the Monothe- letes, "who acknowledged a human mind in Christ, but denied to Christ a human will." (BRCHM.) [4] HOLL. (656): "1. The true and eternal divine nature is proved by the most complete arguments, derived (a) from the divine names (arg. honomastikois); (b) from the attributes peculiar to the true God alone (arg. idiomatikois); (c) from the personal and essen- tial acts of God (arg. energetikois); (d) from the religious worship due God alone (arg. latreutikois);" cf. chapter on the Trinity, note 34. "II. That Christ is true man, is shown (a) from human names (John 8:40; 1 Tim. 2:5); (b) from the essential parts of a man (John 2:21; Heb. 2:14; Luke 24:39; John 10:15; Matt. 26:38; Luke 2:52; John 5:21; Matt. 26:39); (c) from the attributes peculiar to a true man (Matt. 4:2; John 19:28; Matt. 25:37; Luke 19:41; John 11:33); (d) from human works (Luke 2:46, 48; Matt. 4:1; 26:55); (3) from the genealogy of Christ as a man (in the ascending line, Luke 3:23; in the descending line, Matt. 1:1)." [5] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 11):... "Christ, conceived of the Holy Ghost, took upon Himself a human nature without sin, pure. Therefore the infirmities, which as punishments accompany sin, would not have been in the flesh of Christ by necessity of the con- dition, but His body could have been kept clear and exempt from these infirmities. Sinful flesh was not necessary to His being true man, as Adam, before the Fall, without the infirmities which are punishments, was true man. But for our sakes, and for our salva- tion, the incarnate Christ, to commend His love to us, willingly took upon Himself these infirmities, that thus He might bear the punishment transferred from us to Himself, and might free us from it." HUTT. (l. c., 125): "That He took upon Himself these, not so far as they have reference to any guilt, but only as they have the condition of punishment; neither, indeed, these individually and collectively, but only such as the work of Redemption rendered it necessary for Him to take upon Himself, and which detract nothing from the dignity of His nature." But a distinction is made between natural and personal infirmities. HOLL. (657): "The natural infirmities common to men are those ---------------------End of Page 299-------------------------------- which, since the Fall, exist in all men, e.g., to hunger, to thirst, to be wearied, to suffer cold and heat, to be grieved, to be angry, to be troubled, to weep. Since they are without guilt, Christ, ac- coriding to the testimony of Holy Scripture, took them upon Him- self, not by constraint, but freely; not for His own sake, but for our sake" (QUEN. (III, 76): "that He might perform the work of a mediator, and become a victim for our sins"), "not forever, but for a time, namely, in the state of humiliation, and not retain- ing the same in the state of exaltation.... Personal infirmities are those which proceed from particular causes, and derive their origin either from an imperfection of formative power in the one beget- ting, as consumption, gout; or from a particular crime, as intem- perance in eating and drinking, such as fever, dropsy, etc.; or from a special divine judgment, as the diseases of the family of Job (2 Sam. 3:29). These are altogether remote from the most holy human- ity of Christ, because to have assumed these would not have been of ad- vantage to the human race, and would have detracted from human dignity." [6] HOLL. (657): "To the human nature of Christ there belong certain individual designations, by which, as by certain distinctive characteristics or prerogatives, He excels other men; such are (a) anupostasia, the being without a peculiar subsistence, since this is replaced by the divine person (hupostasis) of the Son of God, as one far more exalted. If the human nature of Christ had retained its peculiar subsistence, there would have been in Christ two persons, and therefore two mediators, contrary to 1 Tim. 2:5. The reason is, because a person is formally constituted in its being by a sub- sistence altogether complete, and therefore unity of person is to be determined from unity of subisistence. Therefore, one or the other nature, of those which unite in one person, must be without its own peculiar subsistence; and, since the divine nature, which is really the same as its subsistence, cannot really be without the same, it is evident that the absence of a peculiar subsistence must be ascribed to the human nature." Still, a distinction must be made between anupostasia and enupostasia. QUEN. (III, 77): "That is annupostaton which does not subsist of itself and according to its peculiar personality; but that is enupostaton which subsists in another, and becomes the partaker of the hypostasis of another. When, therefore, the human nature of Christ is said to be anupostatos, nothing else is meant than that it does not subsist of itself, and according to itself, in a peculiar personality; moreover, it is called ennupostatos, because it has become a partaker of the hypostasis of another, and subsists in the logos." ------------------------End of Page 300-------------------------------- HOLL. (658) considers the following objections: "You say, `If the human nature is without a peculiar subsistence, the same will be more imperfect than our nature, which is authupostatos, or sub- sisting of itself.' Reply: `The perfection of an object is to be determined from its essence, and not from its subsistence'" The observation of GRH. (III, 421) is also of imprtance: "Anupostaton has a twofold meaning. Absolutely, that is said to be anupostaton, which subsists neither in its own hupostasis, nor in that of another, which has neither essence nor subsistence, is neither in itself, nor in another, but is purely negative. In this sense, the human nature of Christ cannot be said to be anupostaton. Relatively, that is tsaid to be anupostaton, which does not subsist in its own, but in the hupostasis of another; which indeed has essence, but not person- ality and subsistence peculiar to itself. In this sense, the flesh of Christ is said to be anupostatos, because it is enupostatos, subsisting in the logos." "The statement of some, that the starting-point of the incarnation is the anupostasia of the flesh intervening between that subsistence, on the one hand, by which the mass whereof the body of Christ was formed subsisted as a part of the Virgin, not by its own subsistence and that of the Virgin; and the subsistence, on the other hand, whereby the huamn nature, formed from the sanctified mass by the operation of the Holy Ghost in the first moment of incarnation, began to subsist with the very subsistence of the logos, communicated to it, is not to be received in such a sense as though the flesh of Christ was at any time entirely anupostatos; but, because in our thought, such an anupostasia is regarded prior to its reception into the subsistence of the logos, not with regard to the order of time, but to that of nature. The flesh and soul were not first united into one person; but the formation of the flesh, by the Holy Ghost, from the separated and sanctified mass, the giving of a soul to this flesh as formed, the taking up of the formed and animated flesh into the subsistence of the logos, and the conception of the formed, animated, and subsisting flesh in the womb of the virgin, were simultaneous." (b) anamartesia. CHEMN. (de duab. nat., 13, 14): "For this reason Gabriel says to Mary, `The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee, so that what shall be born of thee will be holy.' Therefore, the working of the Holy Ghost caused the Virgin Mary without male seed to conceive and be with child. And the Holy Ghost so sanctified, and cleansed from every spot of sin, the mass which the Son of God, in the conception, assumed from the flesh and blood of Mary, that that which is born of Mary was holy, Is. 53:9; Dan. 9:24; Luke 1:35; 2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 7:26; 1 Pet. 1:19; 2:22." ------------------End of Page 301------------------------------------- (QUEN. (III, 77): "I say inherent, not imputative, sinlessness; for our sins were really imputed to Him, and He was made sin for us, 2 Cor. 5:21.") SCHRZR. (189): "Christ never sinned, nor was He even able to sin. We prove the statement that He was not even able to sin, or that He was impeccable, as follows: (alpha) He who is like men, sin only excepted, cannot be peccable. For, since all men are pec- cable, Christ would be like them also with regard to sin and pecca- bility, which contradicts the apostle, Heb. 7:26. (beta) He who is both holy by His origin, and is exempt from original sin, who can never have a depraved will, and constitutes one person with God Himself, is clearly impeccable. (gamma) He who is higher than the angels is altogether impeccable. (delta) He to whom the Holy Ghost has been given without measure, is also holy and just without measure, and therefore cannot sin." (c) An eminent excellence of soul and body. QUEN. (III, 78): "A threefold perfection of soul, viz., of intellect, will, and desire." (HOLL. (658): "The soul of Christ contains excellences of wis- dom, Luke 2:47; John 7:46, and of holiness.") "The perfec- tion of body: (alpha) THe highest eukrasia, a healthful and uniform temperament of body. (beta) athanasia, or immortality" (HOLL. (ib.) "which belongs to Him, both because of the soundness of an im- peccable nature, Rom. 6:23, and through the indissoluble bond of the personal union. Christ, therefore, is immortal, by reason of an intrinsic principle, and the fact that He died arose from an ex- trinsic principle, and according to a voluntary arrangement, John 10:17, 18. Yet, in the death which was voluntarily submitted to, the body of Christ remained aphtharton, or exempt from corruption, Ps. 16:10; Acts 2:31.") (gamma) "The greatest elegance and beauty of form, Ps. 45:2." (HOLL. (ib.): "The beauty of Christ's body is inferred from the excellence of the soul inhabiting it,... and from the immediate operation of the Holy Ghost, by whose effica- cious presence the most glorious temple of Christ's body was formed." QUEN. (III, 78): "The passage, `He was despised and rejected of men,' Is. 53:3, refers to the deformity arising from the wounds of the passion.") [7] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 18): "It is not sufficient to know and to believe that in Christ there are, in some way or other, two natures, divine and human, but we must add to this that, in the hypostatic union, they are so closely joined, that there is one and the same subsistence consisting of these two natures, and subsisting in two natures." HOLL. (668): "The divine and human natures existing in the --------------------End of Page 302------------------------------------ one united person of the Son of God have one and the same hypostasis, yet have it in a diverse mode. For the divine nature has this primarily, of itself and independently; but the human nature has this secondarily, because of the personal union, and therefore by partaking of it from another (Lat. participative)." [8] BR. (461): "The union of the human nature with the divine consists in this, that the natures are so joined that they become one person." Expressions of like import are sarkosis, ensarkosis, sarkogennesia, incarnation, becoming man, becoming body (incorpo- ratio, enanthropesis and ensomatosis), assumption (proslepsis). QUEN. (III, 80): "The basis of this mystery is found in John 1:14; Gal. 4:4; 1 Tim. 3:16; Heb. 2:14, 16; Rom. 9:5." Definition--HOLL. (665): "The incarnation is a divine act, by which the Son of God, in the womb of His mother, the Virgin Mary, took into the unity of His person a human nature, consub- stantial with us, but without sin, and destitute of a subsistence of its own, and communicated to the same both His divine person and nature, so that Christ now subsists forever, as the God-man, in two natures, divine and human, most intimately united." [9] GRH. (III, 413): "The question is asked, `How is the work of incarnation ascribed to the Father and Holy Ghost, so that, nevertheless, the Son alone is said to be incarnate?' We dis- tinguish between (1) the sanctification of the mass whereof the body of Christ was formed, which cleansed it from every stain of sin, and (2) the formation of the body of Christ from the sancti- fied mass by divine power, which twofold action is common to the entire Trinity, and (3) the assumption of that body into the person of the logos, which is peculiar to the Son of God. Whence the work of incarnation, so far as the act is concerned, is said to be com- mon to the entire Trinity; but, so far as the end of the assumed flesh, which is the person of the logos, is concerned, it is peculiar to the Son. So far as the effecting or production of the act is concerned, it is said to be a work ad extra and essential, or common to the entire Trinity. So far as its termination or relation is concerned, it is a work ad extra and personal, or peculiar to the Son.* The act of assumption proceeds from the divine virtue common to the three persons; the end of the assumption is the person peculiar to the Son. The Father sent the Son into the world. The Holy Ghost, coming upon the drops of blood from which the body of Christ was formed, sanctified and cleansed them from all sin, in order that that which would be born of Mary should be holy, and by divine power ---------------------------------------------------------------------- *Compare chapter on the Trinity, note 22. ----------------------End of Page 303---------------------------------- so wrought in the blessed Virgin that, contrary to the order of nature, she conceived offspring without male seed. The Son de- scended from heaven, overshadowed the Virgin, came into flesh, and became flesh by partaking of the same, by manifesting Himself in the same, and by taking it into the unity of His persons." (In Luke 1:35, "The power of the Highest shall overshadow thee," is generally understood as referring to the Son.) HOLL. (661): "Overshadowing denotes the mysterious and wonderful filling of the temple of the body, formed by the Holy Ghost. For the Son of God overshadowed the Virgin Mary, while He descended in an inscrutable manner into the womb of the Virgin, and by a peculiar assimilation filled and united to Himself a particle of the Virgin's blood excited by the Holy Spirit, so that He dwelt in it bodily, as in His own temple." (Id. 661 and 662): "The conception of the God-man is referred to the Holy Ghost, Luke 1:35: (a) because the entire work of fructifying is ascribed to Him, Gen 1:2; (b) in order that the purity of the particle of blood, from which the flesh of Christ grew, might be the more evident; (c) that thus the cause of the generation of Christ as a man, and of our regeneration, might be the same, viz., the Holy Ghost. The material source, and that the entire source, of the conception and production of Christ, the man, is Mary, the pure Virgin (Is. 7:14), born of the royal pedi- gree of David, and therefore of the tribe of Judah (Luke 3; Acts 2:30). The material, partial and proximate source is the quickened seed of the Virgin (Heb. 2:14, 16)." Against the above, Vorstius, following the Socinians, asserts: "That the Holy Ghost in forming Christ, the man, supplied the place of male seed, yea, even of man himself, and that nothing was absent from the generation of Christ except the agency and seed of a male." GERHARD, in reply, asks (III, 417): "Whether, because of the peculiar work of the Holy Ghost in the conception of Christ, it is right to call Him the father of Christ?" and answers: "By no means; for none of those acts which are ascribed to the Holy Ghost, in this work, confers upon Him the right and title of father. The devout old authors confine this action to three points. The first is the immediate energy which gave the Virgin the power of conceiving offspring, contrary to the order of nature, without male seed. The second is the miraculous sanctification, which santified, i.e., cleansed from sin, the mass of which the body of the Son of God was formed. The third is the mysterious union, which joined the human and divine natures into one person. The Holy Ghost was not the spermatic, but (a) the formative (demiourgike), (b) the sanctifying (agiastike), (c) the completing (teleiotike) cause of coneption... ----------------------End of Page 304----------------------------------- But, because of none of these operations can the Holy Ghost be called the father of Christ, because the flesh of Christ was not be- gotten of the essence of the Holy Ghost, but of the substance of the Virgin Mary. `Of the Holy Ghost,' does not denote the material, but the efficient cause and operation.... When we say, `Of the Holy Ghost,' the `of' is potential." [10] CHEM. (de duab. nat., 23): "The human nature did not assume the divine, nor did man assume God, nor did the divine person assume a human person; but the divine nature of the logos, or God the logos, or the person of the Son of God, subsisting from eternity in the divine nature, assumed in the fulness of time a cer- tain mass of human nature, so that in Christ there is an assuming nature, viz., the divine, and an assumed nature, viz., the human. In other cases, human nature is always the nature of a certain individual, whose peculiarity it is to subsist in a certain hypostasis, which is distinguished by a characteristic property from the other hypostases of the same nature. Thus each man has a soul of his own. But in the incarnate Christ, the divine nature subsisted of itself before this union, and indeed from eternity. Yet the mass of the assumed nature did not thus subsist of itself before this union, so that before this union there was a body and soul belonging to a cetain and distinct individual, i.e., a peculiar person subsisting in itself, which afterwards the Son of God assumed. But in the very act of conception, the Son of God assumed this mass of human nature into the unity of His person, to subsist and be sustained therein, adn, by assuming it, made it His own, so that this body is not that of another individual or another person, but the body is peculiar to the Son of God Himself, and the soul is the peculiar soul of the Son of God Himself." (Id. Loc. c. Th., I, 76): "Since in the incarnate Christ there are two intelligent, indi- vidual natures, and yet ony one person, because there is one Christ, we say that these two natures are united, not in such a manner that the human nature of Christ was conceived and formed in the womb of Mary, before the divine nature was united to it. For if, before the union, the humanity of Christ had ever by itself had a subsis- tence, there would then be in Christ two persons also, just as there are two intelligent individual natures." The communication of person or subsistence, therefore, proceeds from the logos. HOLL. (668): "The communication of person is that by which the Son of God truly and actually conferred upon His assumed human nature, destitute of proper personality, His own divine person, for communion and participation, so that the same might reach a ter- minus, be perfected in subsisting, and be established in a final hypostatic existence." ------------------------End of Page 305------------------------------- [11] QUEN. (III, 83): "Of these two extremes (the divine and the human nature), one has the relation of an agent or of one per- fecting, and the other the relation of one passive and able to be perfected. The former is the Son of God, or the simple person of the logos, or, what is the same thing, the divine nature determined by the person of the logos; the latter is the human nature.... The former extreme is the active principle of perichoresis, which acts and perfects; the latter the passive principle of the same perichoresis, which is perfected or receives the perfections." KG. (126): "Perichoresis (immission, active intermingling) is that by which the divine nature of the logos, in perfecting, pervades inwardly and all around, so to speak, the human nature, and imparts to all of it its entire self, i.e., in the totality and perfection of its essence, Col. 2: 9." Moreover its effect is, that the fulness of the Godhead dwells in the human nature, and both natures are, in the highest degree, present to each other. [12] GRH. (III, 412): "The state of the union is properly and specifically called union, hypostatic union, and is the most inti- mate perichoresis, or unmixed and unconfused pervasion in one per- son of two distinct natures, mutually present in the highest degree to each other, because of which one nature is not outside of the other, neither can it be without impairing the unity of the person. Such a distinction is made between the state and the act of the union, that the act is transient and the state is permanent; that the act is that of a simple person, i.e., of the logos, who before His incarna- tion was a simple person, upon a human nature, but the state exists between two natures, divine and human, in a complex per- son; that the act consists in the assumption of humanity, made in the first moment of incarnation, but the state, in the most intimate and enduring cohesion of natures." QUEN. (III, 86): "The form of this personal union implies: (a) The participation or communion of one and the same person, 1 Tim. 2:5; (b) the intimate personal and constant mutual pres- ence of the nature, John 1:14; Col. 2:9." [13] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. VIII, 6): "Although the Son of God is Himself an entire and distinct person of the eternal God- head, and therefore from eternity has been, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, true, essential, and perfect God; yet that He assumed human nature into the unity of His person, not as though there resulted in Christ two persons, or two Christs, but that now Jesus Christ, in one person, is at the same time true eternal God, begotten of the Father from eternity, and true man." CHMN. (de duab. nat., 25): "To the specific difference of the ------------------End of Page 306------------------------------------ hypostatic union belongs the fact that these two natures are joined and united, in order to constitute one personality in the incarnate Christ, i.e., the nature inseparably assumed in the union became so peculiar to the person of the Word assuming it, that although there are and remain in Christ two natures, without change and mixture, with the distinction between the natures and essential attributes unimpaired, yet there are not two Christs, but only one Christ." Hence, since the act of union, Christ is called a complex person. GRH. (III, 427): "The hypostasis is called complex, not because it became composite, by suffering in and of itself an alteration and loss of its simplicity, but because, since the incarnation, it is an hypostasis of two natures, while before it was an hypostasis of the divine nature alone. Before the incarnation the person of the logos was self-determined and simple, subsisting only in the divine nature; by the incarnation the hypostasis became complex, consist- ing, at the same time, of the divine and human nature, and thus not only His divine, but also His assumed human nature, belongs to the entireness of the person of Christ now incarnate. Because the hypos- tasis of the logos became an hypostasis of the flesh, therefore the hypostasis of the logos was imparted to the flesh," and hence there follows the impartation of personality to the human nature. [14] HFRFFR. (263): "These two natures in Christ are united (a) inconvertibly. For He became the Son of God, not by the change of His divine nature into flesh; (2) unconfusedly. For the two natures are one, not by a mingling, through which a third ob- ject (tertium quiddam) comes into being, preserving in no respect the entireness of the simple natures; (3) inseparably and uninter- ruptedly. For the two natures in Christ are so united that they are never separated by any intervals, either of time or place. There- fore this union has not been dissolved in death, and the logos can- not be shown at any place without the assumed human nature. For the Son of God took upon Himself human nature, not as a garment which He again would lay aside. Neither did the Son of God appear, as angels sometimes have appeared, in human form to men, but He made the assumed flesh His own, and since He has assumed it, never leaves it. For, according to the Council of Chalcedon: `We confess one and the same Jesus Christ, the Son and Lord only-begotten, in two natures, without mixture, change, division, or separation (en duo phusein, asungchutos, atreptos, adiairetos, achoristos).'" [15] GRH. (III, 428): "For neither has a part been united to a part, but the entire logos to the entire flesh, and the entire flesh -----------------------End of Page 307-------------------------------- to the entire logos; therefore, because of the identity of person and the pervasion of the natures by each other, the logos is so present to the flesh, and the flesh is so present to the logos, that neither the logos is without the flesh, nor the flesh without the logos, but wherever the logos is, there He has the flesh present in the highest degree with Himself, because He has taken this into the unity of His person; and wherever the flesh is, there it has the logos in the highest degree present to itself, because the flesh has been taken into His person. As the logos is not without the divine nature, to which the person belongs, so also is He not without His flesh, finite indeed in essence, yet personally subsisting in the logos. For as, by eternal generation from the Father, His own divine nature is peculiar to the logos, so through the personal union, flesh became peculiar to the same logos." FORM. CONC., Sol. Dec., VIII, 11. [16] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 7): "We believe that now, in this undivided person of Christ, there are two distinct natures, namely, the divine, which is from eternity, and the human, which in time was taken into the unity of the person of the Son of God. And these two natures in the person of Christ are never either sep- arated, or commingled, or changed the one into the other, but each remains in its nature and substance, or essence, in the person of Christ to all eternity. We believe... that as each nature in its nature and essence remains unmingled, and never ceases to exist, so each nature retains its natural essential properties, and to all eternity does not lay them aside." [17] GRH. (III, 422): "The mode of this union is wonderfully unique and uniquely wonderful, transcending the comprehension not ony of all men, but even of angels, whence it is called `with- out controversy, a great mystery.' There are various and diverse modes of union which are to be excluded from the mode of the personal union. For, as devout old writers say that it is better to know and be able to express what God is not, than what He is, so also of the divine and supernatural union of the two natures in Christ, we can truly affirm that it is easier to tell what is not, than what is its mode." From the Holy Scriptures, GRH. (ib.) justifies the above- mentioned presentation of this doctrine as follows: "The more prominent passages of Scripture which speak of the union of the two natures in Christ are: John 1:14; Col. 2:9; 1 Tim. 3:16; Heb. 2:14-16. As these are all parallel, they must be constantly connected in the explanation of the union. John says: `The Word was made flesh;' but, lest any one think that the Word was made flesh in the same sense that the water was made wine, Paul -------------------End of Page 308--------------------------------- says that God, i.e., the Son of God, `was manifest in the flesh,' and that `He took part of flesh and blood' (kekoinoneke). But now communion is between at least two distinct things, otherwise it would be interchange and coalescence. God is said by the apostle to have been `manifest in the flesh;' but, lest any one might think that it was such a manifestation as there was in the Old Testament, when either God Himself or angels appeared in outward forms, John says that the `logos became flesh,' i.e., that He so took flesh into His person as never afterwards to lay it aside. The Son of God is said to have taken on Him the seed of Abraham; but, lest any one might think that it was an assumption such as that was when angels for a time took upon them corporeal forms, it is said that, `as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself likewise took part of the same.' But now it is evident that children partake of flesh and blood in such a manner that, by birth, flesh and blood, or human nature, is imparted to them by their parents. The apostle described the union by the dwelling of the logos in assumed flesh; but, lest any one might think that the Son of God dwelt in assumed flesh in the manner in which God dwells, through grace, in the hearts of believers, he adds signifi- cantly that all the fulness of the Godhead dwells in the assumed flesh, and that, too, bodily, to denote the dwelling-place, or per- sonally, to express the mode of union." [18] The negative properties are enumerated very differently by the Dogmaticians. Besides those specified in the text, the most prominent are these: "The union occured (a) asungchutos, un- confusedly; (b) atreptos, inconvertibly; (c) adiairetos, indivisibly; (d) achoristos, inseparably; (e) analloiotos, uninterchangeably; (f) adialutos, indissolubly; (g) adiastatos, uninterruptedly." Or, "Not by reason of place (topikos), as formerly in the temple at Jerusalem; not by reason of power (energetikos), as in creatures; not by reason of grace (charientos), as in saints; not by reason of glory (doxastikos), as in the blessed and the angels." PARA. 33. Continuation. The hypostasis of the divine nature having thus, through the personal union, become at the same time that of the human nature, and thus no longer only a divine but a divine and human nature being now predicated of the person of the Re- deemer, a real communion of both natures is thereby asserted, in consequence of which the two natures sustain no merely outward relation to each other; for, as the hypostasis of the -----------------End of Page 309------------------------------------ divine nature is not essentially different from this nature itself, and this hypostasis has imparted itself to the human nature, it therefore follows that there exists between the divine and human nature a true and real impartation and communion. [1] The first effect of the personal union is, therefore, the "communion (also communication) of natures." QUEN. (III, 87): "The communion of natures is that most intimate partic- ipation (koinonia) and combination (sunduasis) of the divine nature of the logos and of the asssumed human nature, by which the logos, through a most intimate and profound perichoresis, so permeates, perfect, inhabits, and appropriates to Himself the human nature that is personally united to Him, that from both, mutually inter-communicating, there arises the one in- communicable subject, viz., one person." As, however, in the act of union, the divine nature is regarded as the active one, and the divine logos as that which asssumed the human nature, so the intercommunion of the two natures must be so under- stood as that, between the two natures, the active movement proceeds from the divine nature, and it is this that permeates the human. [2] It is, indeed, just as difficult for us to form an adequate conception of this as in the case of the personal union, and we must be satisfied with analogies, which furnish us with at least an approximate conception of it. Such we may find, e.g., in the union of soul and body; in the relation in which the three persons of the Godhead stand towards each other; or in the relation between iron and fire in red-hot iron. Just as the soul and body do not stand outwardly related to each other, as a man to the clothing that he has put on, or as an angel to the body in which he appears, but as the union between soul and body is a real, intimate and perfect one, so is also the union and communion of the two natures. As body and soul are inseparably united, and constitute the one man, so are also the human and divine natures most insepar- ably united. As the soul acts upon the body and is united with it, without there being any mingling of the two, the soul remaining soul and the body remaining body, so are we also to regard the communion of the two natures in such a light, that each abides in its integrity. As, finally, the soul is never without the body, so also the logos is to be regarded as always in the flesh and never without it. [3] ----------------End of Page 310--------------------------------- If, now, there really exists such a communion of natures, it follows-- I. That the personal designations derived from the two na- tures must be mutually predicable of each other; that we must therefore just as well be able to say, "The man (Christ Jesus) is God," as "God is man," which expressions, of course, do not signify that God, having become man, has ceased to be God, but rather, that the same Christ, who is God, is at the same time man (HOLL. (686): "The Son of God, personally, is the same as the Son of man: and the Son of man, person- ally, is the same as the Son of God"); whence the predicate "man" belongs just as much to the subject God as the predi- cate "God" belongs to the subject man. [4] For, if we refuse to say this, we would betray the fact that we conceive, not of two natures in Christ, but rather of two persons, each remain- ing as it originally was, which would be Nestorianism. From the communion of natures are, therefore, deduced the personal designations, i.e., statements in which the concrete of one nature (as united) is predicated of the concrete of the other nature; i.e., the two essences really (alethos) different, the divine and the human, are in the concrete reciprocally predi- cated of one another, really and truly, yet in a manner very singular and unusual, in order to express the personal union. [5] To guard against a misunderstanding of these personal designations, it may be more particularly stated that they are (1) not merely verbal, i.e., they are not to be understood as if only the name, but not the nature thereby designated, were predicated of the subject, as Nestorius does, when he says of the son of Mary, He was the Son of God, ascribing to the sub- ject a title, as it were, but altogether refusing to acknowledge that He who was the son of Mary was also really the Son of God; (2) not identical (when the same thing is predicated of itself); i.e., the predicates that are ascribed to the subject dare not be so explained as if they applied to it only in so far as the predicate precisely corresponds to the nature from which the designation of the subject is derived. The proposition, "The Son of God is the son of Mary," dare not, therefore, be inter- preted, "The man who is united with the Son of God is the son of Mary;" (3) not metaphorical, figurative, or tropical; as ----------------End of Page 311------------------------------------ when, in the predicate that is applied to a subject, not the es- sential nature itself of the subject is ascribed to it, but only partiuclar qualities of this predicate are appropriated to the subject, so that it might be said, in a figurative sense, God is man, as we understand the expression when it is applied to a picture: "This is a man," "a woman;" or, when it is said of Herod, "He is a fox;" (4) not essential and univocal; as if the subject, in its essential nature, were that which the predicate ascribes to it (the expression, "God is man," would then mean, The nature of God is this, that it is the nature of man). The personal designations are rather-- (1) Real; i.e., that which is ascribed to the subject really and truly belongs to it. (2) Unusual and singular; for, as there is no other example of the personal union, so there are no other examples of the personal designations. But from the communion of natures it follows also-- II. That there is a participation of the natures in the person as well as of the natures with each other. [6] This is set forth in the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum. BR. (467): "The communicatio idiomatum is that by which it comes to pass that those things which, when the two natures are com- pared together, belong to one of them per se and formally, are to be truly predicated, also, of the other nature (either as re- gards concretes, or for that which is peculiar to it.)" [7] Ac- cording to this doctrine, therefore, it is neither possible to ascribe a quality to one of the two natures, which is not a quality of the whole person, nor is it possible to predicate an act or operation of one of the two natures, in which the other nature does not participate (not, however, in such a way as if along with the qulaities or the acts proceeding from them, their underlying essence were transferred to the other nature). [8] There exists, therefore, a communicatio idiomatum between the natures and the person, and between the natures recipro- -cally. [9] The communicatio idiomatum is, therefore, of sev- eral genera, of which we enumerate three (for so many are distinctly mentioned in the Scriptures), [10] the idiomatic, majestatic, and apostelesmatic. ----------------End of Page 312----------------------------------- I. THE IDIOMATIC GENUS. If the two natures are really united in one person, then every idioma (peculiarity) that originally belongs to one of the two natures must be predicated of the entire person; the idio- mata (peculiarities) of the divine nature, as well as those of the human nature, must belong to the person of the Redeemer. If, therefore, to be born or to suffer is an idioma of the human nature, then we must just as well be able to say, "Christ, the God-man, was born, suffered," as it is said of Him, "by Him were all things created," although creation is an idioma of the divine nature. [11] For, if we will not say this, but maintain that an idioma of the human nature can be predicated only of the concrete of the human nature, and an idioma of the di- vine nature only of the concrete of the divine nature, so that we would say: "The man, Jesus Christ, was born," "by Christ, who is God, all things were created;" then the personal union would be set aside, and it would appear that two per- sons and not two natures are recognized. [12] But it is just in this that the personal union shows itself to be real, that all the idiomata which belong to the one or the other nature are equally idiomata of the person. As, further, in virtue of the communion of natures, and of the personal designations re- sulting therefrom, it is all the same whether we designate Christ by both of His natures or only by one of them, an idioma of one of the two natures can be just as readily predi- cated of the concrete of the one as of the other; we can, there- fore, just as well say, "God is dead," as, "the man, Jesus Christ, is Almighty." [13] While, however, the idiomata of the two natures are attri- buted to the concrete of both natures (to Christ, the God-man) or to the concrete of one of the two natures (God--the man, Christ Jesus), it by no means follows from this that therefore the idiomata of the one nature becomes those of the other; for the two natures are not in substance changed by the personal union, but each of them retains the idiomata essential and na- tural to itself. Therefore it is only to the person that, withou further distinctions, the idiomata of the one or of the other nature can be ascribed; but this can in no wise happen be- tween the natures themselves, in such a sense as though each --------------End of Page 313--------------------------------- of them did not retain the idiomata esesential to itself. [14] To avoid such a misunderstanding in statements of this kind, it is usual to designate particularly from which nature the idiomata predicated of the person are derived. [15] General Definition.--HOLL. (693): "The first genus of com- municatio idiomatum is this, when such things as are peculiar to the divine or to the human nature are truly and really as- cribed to the entire person of Christ, designated by either nature or by both natures." [16] This genus the later Dogmaticians divide into three species, according as the different idiomata are predicated of the concrete of the divine nature, or of the concrete of both natures. These species are "(a) idiopoiesis (ap- propriation), or oikeiosis (indwelling), when human idiomata are ascribed to the concrete of the divine nature. Acts 3:15; 20: 28; 1 Cor. 2:8; Gal. 2:20. (b) koinonia ton theion (participation of the divine), when the divine idiomata are predicated of the person of the incarnate Word, designated from His human nature. John 6:62; 8:58; 1 Cor. 15:47, (c) antidosis or sunam- photerismos, alteration, or reciprocation, in which as well the di- vine as the human idiomata are predicated concerning the concrete of the person, or concerning Christ, designated from both natures. Heb. 13:8; Rom. 9:5; 2 Cor. 13:4; 1 Pet. 3: 18." (HOLL. 694) II. THE MAJESTATIC GENUS. As the divine logos has assumed human nature, so that by the personal union the hypostasis of the divine nature has be- come also that of the human nature, a further and natural consequence of this is, that thereby the human nature has become partaker of the attributes of the divine nature, and therefore of its entire glory and majesty: [17] for, by the per- sonal union, not only the person, but, since person and nature cannot be separated, the divine nature also has entered into communion with the human nature; and the participation in the divine attributes by the human nature occurs at the very moment in which the logos unites itself with the human nature. [18] But there is no reciprocal effect produced; for, while the human nature can become partaker of the idiomata of the divine, and thus acquire an addition to the idiomata essential ------------------------End of Page 314----------------------------- to itself, the contrary cannot be maintained, because the di- vine nature in its essence is unchangeable and can suffer no increase. [19] The attributes, finally, which, by virtue of the personal union and of the communion of natures, are commu- nicated to the human nature, are truly divine, and are there- fore to be distinguished from the special human excellences possessed by the human nature which the logos assumed, over and above those of other human natures. [20] Definition.--(HOLL. 699): "The second genus of communi- catio idiomatum is that by which the Son of God truly and really communicates the idiomata of His own divine nature to the assumed human nature, in consequence of the personal union, for common possession, use and designation." [21] III. THE APOSTELESMATIC GENUS. The whole design of the incarnation of Christ is none other than that the logos, united with the human nature, may accom- plish the work of redemption. From the communion of the two natures, resulting from the personal union, it follows that none of the influences proceeding from Christ can be attributed to one only of the two natures. [22] The influence may, in deed, proceed from one of the two natures, and each of the two natures exerts the influence peculiar to itself, but in such a way that, while such an influence is being exerted on the part of one of the natures, the other is not idle, but at the same time active; that, therefore, while the human nature suffers, the divine, which indeed cannot also suffer, yet in so far par- ticipates in the suffering of the human nature that it wills this suffering, permits it, stands by the human nature in its suffer- ing, and strengthens and supports it for enduring the imposed burden; [23] further, that the human nature is to be regarded as active, not alone by means of the attributes essentially its own, but that to these are added, by virtue of the second genus of the communicatio idiomatum, the divine attributes imparted to it, with which it operates. [24] For the divine nature could not of itself, alone, have offered a ransom for the redemp- tion of the world; to do this it had to be united with the human nature, which, consisting of soul and body, could be offered up for the salvation of men. Again, the human nature ---------------End of Page 315---------------------------------- could not have accomplished many of the deeds performed (miracles, etc.), had not its attributes been increased by the addition of the divine. [25] Definition--GRH. III, 555): "The third genus of the com- municatio idiomatum is that by which, in official acts, each nature performs what is peculiar to itself, with the participa- tion of the other. 1 Cor. 15:3; Gal. 1:4; Eph. 5:2." [26] If we now contemplate the entire doctrine of the Person of Christ, its supreme importance at once becomes manifest. Only because in Christ the divine and human natures were joined together in one person, could He accomplish the work of re- demption. [27] In order clearly to exhibit this truth, it has been necessary for us to develop the present doctrine at such length. [28] [1] QUEN. (III, 87): "IF the hypostasis of the logos has been truly and really imparted to the assumed flesh, undoubtedly there is a true and real participation between the divine and the human nature, since the hypostasis of the logos and the divine nature of the logos do not really differ. But as the former is true, so also must be the latter." FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 14): "But we must not regard this hypostatic union as though the two natures, divine and human, are united in the manner in which two pieces of wood are glued together, so as really, or actually and truly, to have no participation whatever with each other. For this is the error and heresy of Nestorius and Paul of Samosata, who thought and taught heretically that the two natures are altogether separate or apart fom one another, and are incapable of any participation whatever. By this false dogma, the natures are separated, and two Christs are invented, one of whom is Christ, but the other God, the logos, dwelling in Christ." QUEN. (III, 143): "THe antithesis of the Calvinists, some of whom teach that it is only the person of the logos, and not, at the same time, His divine nature that has been united to human nature, unless by way of consequence and accompaniment, because of its identity with personality, which alone was at first united. Thus they invent a double union, mediate and immediate; that the natures are united, not immediately, but through the medium of the person of the logos." [2] HOLL. (680): "The communion of natures in the person of Christ is the mutual participation of the divine and human nature of Christ, through which the divine nature of the logos, having be- ----------------End of Page 316------------------------------------- come participant of the human nature, pervades, perfects, inhabits, and appropriates this to itself; but the human, having become par- ticipant of the divine nature, is pervaded, perfected, and inhabited by it." BR. (463): "From the personal union proceeds the participation of natures, through which it comes to pass that the human nature belongs to the Son of God, and the divine nature to the Son of man. For marking this, the word perichoresis, which, according to its orig- inal meaning, denotes penetration, or the existence of one thing in another, began to be employed, so that the divine nature might indeed be said actively to penetrate, and the human nature passively to be penetrated. Ye this must be understood in such a manner as to remove all imperfection. For the divine nature does not penetrate the human so as to occupy successively one part of it after another, and to diffuse itself extensively through it; but, because it is spiritual and indivisible as a whole, it energizes and perfects at the same time every part of the human nature and the entire nature, and is and remains entire in the entire human nature, and entire in every part of it. Here belongs the passage, Col. 2:9. HOLL. (681): "Perichoresis is not indeed a biblical term; never- theless it is an ecclesiastical term, and began especially to be em- ployed when Nestorius denied the communion of natures. But they did not understand perichoresis as local and quantitative, as an urn is said to contain (chorein) water, but as illocal and metaphori- cally used." [3] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 18, 19): "Learned antiquity has indeed declared this personal union and communion of natures by the similitude of the soul and body, and likewise, in another manner, by that of glowing iron. For the soul and body (and so also fire and iron) have a participation with each other, not merely nominally or verbally, but truly and really; yet in such a manner that no mingling or equalizing of the natures is introdueced, as when honey-water is made of honey and water, for such drink is no longer either pure water or pure honey, but a drink composed of both. Far otherwise is it in the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ, for the union and participation of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ is far more exalted, and is altogether inexpressible." HOLL. (681): "The fathers have seen fit to describe the personal perichoresis (a) from the essential perichoreois of the persons of the Holy Trinity; (b) from the natural perichoresis of body and soul; (c) from the accidental perichoresis of fire and iron. For, as one person of the Trinity is in another, as the soul pervades the body, as fire pene- -------------End of Page 317---------------------------------------- trates all the pores of iron, so the divinity of Christ is in the humanity, which it completely fills and pervades. From this it is easy to infer that perichoresis denotes (1) that the personal union is an inner one and most complete. A union is outward and incom- plete when an angel assumes a body, a pilot stands by a ship, a garment hangs on a man. The teachers of the Church, to separate from it the idea of such an outward union, were in the habit of calling the union a personal union, and the communion proceeding from it perichoresis. For, as the soul does not outwardly stand by the body, nor merely direct its movement, but enters, moves into, and fashions it, by imparting to the body its own essence, life, and faculties; so the logos enters the flesh, and inwardly communicates to it its own divine nature. (2) That the communion of natures is mutual, yet in such a manner that the divine nature, as actual being (entelecheia), i.e., as a most absolute act, permeates and per- fects and assumed human nature, and the assumed flesh is perme- ated and perfected. (3) That the personal union and communion of natures in Christ is inseparable (achoriston). The rational soul so enters the body that it could in no way have been separated from it, if, by the divine judgment, the violence of death had not fol- lowed from the Fall accidentally intervening. It is true that the natural union of soul and body was dissolved during the three days of Christ's death; but the divine nature of the logos was not sepa- rated from the assumed humanity, but was, in the highest degree, present to it. (4) That the natural union and communion is with- out mingling, mixture, or change (asungchuton, amikton, kai atrepton). As the persons of the Trinity permeate each other without mixture; as the soul fashions the body without any disturbance, mingling, or change of either; so the logos pervades His own flesh in such manner that in essentials there is in no respect a giving way by either, and neither is mingled or mixed with the other. (5) That the natures of Christ have been united continuously (adiastatous), or are mu- tually present to each other. The persons of the Trinity enter each other so mutually that neither is outside of nor beyond the other. In like manner the rational soul is in the body so as never to be outside of or beyond it; the logos also is in the flesh, so as never to be beyond, and never to be outside of it." [4] GRH. (III, 453): "The source and foundation of the per- sonal designations consist solely and alone in the personal union and participation of natures, from which they alone and immedia- tely proceed, from which alone, also, they are to be judged and explained. For God is man, and man is God, because the human and divine natures in Christ are personally united, and because an ---------------End of Page 318-------------------------------------- inner perichoresis exists betwen these two natures personally united, so that the divine nature of the logos does not subsist outside of the assumed human nature, and the assumed human nature does not subsist outside of the divine. God is and is called man, because the hypostasis of the logos is the hypostasis not only of His divine, but also of His human nature." Scriptural examples: Jer. 23:5, 6; 33:17; Matt. 22:42-45; Luke 20:44; Ps. 110:1; 2 Sam. 7:19; Is. 9:6; Matt. 1:21-23; 16:13, 16; Luke 1:35; 2:11; 1 Cor. 15:47. [5] a. The expression "concrete" was employed when a personal designation was sought for Christ, as one who is of two natures. If the personal designation was derived from one of His two natures, the same was called the concrete of that nature; and, there- fiore, since Christ is of two natures, the concrete of the divine nature, when the designation was derived from the divine nature; the con- crete of the human nature, when the designation was derived from the human nature. To the former class belong the designations, "God," "Son of God," etc.; to the latter, "man," "Son of man," "Son of Mary." HOLL. (685): "The concrete of a nature is a term whereby the nature is expressed with a connotation of the hypostasis." BR. (465): "By the concrete, a term is understood which, in the direct sense, denotes a suppositum, but in an indi- rect sense a nature. Thus God denotes a suppositum, having a divine nature; man denotes a suppositum, having a human nature. Still, a distinction must be made between the concrete of the nature, and the concrete of the person; the latter expression is employed where the personal designation has not been derived so much from one of the two natures, as where it rather serves to designate, through an expression elsewhere derived, the particular person in whom the two natures are united as one person." BR. (466): "The concrete of a person is such a term or name, as formally signifies the person consisting of both natures, eg., Christ, Mes- siah, Immanuel; which names, in the nominative case, denote the suppositum, and, in an oblique case, neither nature alone, but rather both." In the present case, only the concrete of the nature comes into use; for the question is only in reference to the cases in which the communion of natures shall also express itself in their personal designations. To personal designations, in the proper sense, such designations do not belong, in which a concrete of the nature is predicated of a concrete of the person, as occurs in the sentences: Christ is God, is man, is God-man. GRH. (III, 453): "For this designations accurately and formally express, not so much the unity of person, as the duality of natures in Christ; for -----------------------End of Page 319----------------------------- Christ is and is called man, because in Him there is a human nature; and He is and is called God, because in Him there is a divine nature; and He is and is called the God-man, because in Him there is not only a human, but also a divine nature." It is furthermore self-evident that these designations can be em- ployed only upon the presupposition of the personal union, and that they are not universally applicable. Hence, HOLL. (685): "If the divine and human natures, or man and God, be regarded outside of the personal union, they are disparate, neither can the one be affirmed of the other. For as I cannot say: a lion is a horse, so also I cannot say: God is man. But if a union exists between God and man, and that too a real union, such as exists in Christ, between the divine and human natures, they can be cor- rectly predicated of each other in the concrete. The reason is, because, through the union, the two natures constitute one person, and every concrete of the nature denotes the person itself. Since, therefore, Christ the man is the same person who is God, or this person who is God is that very person who is man, it is also said correctly: man is God, and God is man." b. To the abstracts of nature ("an abstract is that by which a nature is considered, yet not with respect to its union, but in itself, and withdrawn from its union or the concrete, nevertheless not actually, but only in the mind." HFRFFR. (283)) the like does not apply, as to the concretes of nature; therefore it cannot be said that deity is humanity, and humanity is deity. QUEN. (III, 88): "The reason is, because the union was not made to one nature, but to one complex person, with the difference of natures unim- paired, and therefore, one nature in the abstract is not predicated of the other, but the concrete of one nature is predicated of the concrete of the other nature." [6] GRH. (III, 466): "Whatever in the assumption of human nature comes under the union, that also comes under the participa- tion. But now the properties come under the union, because no nature is destitute of its own properties, since a nature without properties is also without existence, and the two natures are united in Christ, not as alone, or stripped of their properties, but entire, without incompleteness, having suffered no loss of peculiarities. Therefore, the properties also come under the participation." HOLL. (691): "No union can be perfect and permeant (peri- choristic) without a participation of properties, as the examples of animated body show. We readily grant that a parastatic (adja- cent) union of two pieces of wood may occur without a participa- tion of properties, because that grade of union is low and imperfect. ----------------End of Page 320---------------------------------------- But, according to the definitinn of Scripture, the personal union of the two natures in Christ is most absolute, perfect and permeant (perichoristic); therefore it cannot be without a participation of properties." In like manner, proof can be produced from the communion of natures, which, just as the union, has the participa- tion of properties (commun. idiom.) as a necessary consequence. [7] HOLL. (690): "The communicatio idiomatum is a true and real participation of the properties of the divine and human natures, resulting from the personal union in Christ, the God-man, who is denominated from either or both natures." Explanation of the individual notations of the Communicatio and Idioma. --(a) GRH. (III, 465): "Communicatio (communication) is the distribution of one thing which is common to many, to the many which have it in common." QUEN. (III, 91): "Not that the properties become common, idiomata koina, but that through and be- cause of the personal union they become communicable (koinoneta)." (b) idioma, proprium, property. QUEN. (III, 92): "By idiomata are understood the properties and differences of natures, by which, as by certain marks and characteristics, the two natures (in unity of person) are mutually distinguished and known apart. The term idiomata is received either in a narrow sense, for the natural pro- erties themselves, or in a wide sense, so that it comprehends the oper- ations also, through which these properties properly so called exert themselves; in this place, properties or idiomata are received in a wider sense, so that, in addition to the properties strictly so called, they embrace within their compass actions and results, energemata kai apotelesmata, because properties exert themselves through operations and results." GRH. (III, 466): "Observe, that the notion of the divine properties is one thing and that of the human properties another. The properties of the divine nature belong to the very essence of the logos, and are not really distinguished from it. The properties of the human nature do not constitute but proceed from the essence." In regard to the authority for this doctrine, HOLL. (690): "The expression, communicatio idiomatum, is not found in the Holy Scriptures word for word, yet the matter itself has the firmest scriptural foundation. For as often as Scripture attributes to the flesh of Christ actions and works of divine omnip- otence, so often, by consequence, is omnipotence ascribed, as an immediate act, to Him, from whom the divine operation (energeia) proceeds, as a mediate act. But, although the communicatio idio- matum was first so named by the Scholastics, yet orthodox antiquity employed equivalent forms of speech in the controversies with Nestorius and Eutyches." The first complete elaboration of this ----------------End of Page 321------------------------------------ doctrine among the Dogmaticians is given by Chemnitz, in his book, De Duabus Naturis in Christo, 1580. [8] Therefore the more specific caution with regard to the com- municatio, according to which it is said that it is not a "communi- catio kata methexin, or according to the essence, by which one passes into the essence and within the definition of the other; but a com- muinicatio kata sunduasin (not essential or accidental, but) personal, i.e., a participation of the two natures, whereby one of those united is so connected with the other that, the essence remaining distinct, the one, without any mingling, truly receives and par- takes of the peculiar nature, power, and efficacy of the other, through and because of the communion that has occurred." (QUEN., III, 102.) So, also, still more extended definitions have been given, just as of the personal union. GRH. (III, 466): "As the union is not essential, nor merely verbal, neither through mingling, or change, or mixture, or adjacence, neither is it per- sonal or sacramental; so also the communicatio is not such." [9] GRH. (III, 465): "The communicatio idiomatum is of a nature to a person, or of a nature to a nature." HFRFFR. (286): "The communicatio idiomatum is a true and real participation of divine and human properties, by which, because of the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ, not only the idomata of both natures of the person (who is at the same time God and man), but also the properties of each one of the natures, are ascribed to the other, i.e., the human nature to the logos, and the divine nature to the assumed man. And because of the same com- munion, each nature works with a communication of the other, yet with their natures and properties preserved unimpaired." QUEN. (III, 155): "The antithesis of the Calvinists, who (1) state that the communicatio idiomatum is indeed real with respect to the person, designated by Deity or humanity, but that with re- spect to natures it is only verbal, i.e., that it is a communicatio of words and terms and not of properties. (2) They say that those are only verbal designations when human things are declared of God, or divine things of man." [10] QUEN. (III, 92): "Definite and distinct degrees of the communicatio idiomatum are given; but, inasmuch as the question of the number of degrees or genera of the communicatio idiomatum does not pertain to faith and its nature, but to the method of teaching, some define two, others three, and others four genera of properties. Yet the number three pleases most of our theologians, inasmuch as in the holy volume this is discussed according to a threefold method of expression. I say that Holy Scripture dis- ----------------End of Page 322------------------------------------ tinctly presents three genera, although it does not enumerate them." A few Dogmaticians assume four genera of communicatio idiomatum, since they distinguish the declarations in which the properties of the human nature are ascribed to the Son of God, from the declarations in which the properties of one of the two natures are affirmed in reference to the entire person of Christ; and, therefore, the proposition, "Christ suffered," they assign to a different genus from the proposition, "God suffered." Still, the most of the Dogmaticians express themselves against this classification. But the order also in which the three genera are given, is not the same in all the Dogmaticians. QUEN. (ib.): "Some follow the order of doctrine; others the order of nature. The former (Form. Conc., Chmn., Aegid. Hunn.) place the communication of the official actions, since this is more easily explained and less controverted, before the communication of majesty, which is especially controverted and must be explained more fully. The latter follow the order of nature, and place the communication of majesty before the communication of the official actions, because the former by nature precedes the latter." [11] GRH. (III, 472): "The foundation of this communicatio idiomatum is unity of person. For, inasmuch as, since the incar- nation, the one person of Christ subsists in two and of two natures, each of which has been clothed, as it were, with its own proper- ties, the properties of both natures, the divine as well as the human, are affirmed of the one complex (suntheto) person of Christ." FORM CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 36): "Since there are in Christ two distinct natures, which in their essences and properties are neither changed nor mixed, and yet the two natures are but one person, those properties which belong only to one nature are not ascribed to it, apart from the other nature, as if separated, but to the entire person (which at the same time is God and man), whether He be called God or man." [12] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 67): "Nestorius taught such a participation as to ascribe divine properties to Christ only as God, and human properties to Christ only as man; such as that man, not God, was born of Mary, was crucified, etc. Likewise, that God, not man, healed the sick and brought to life the dead. But thus, Christ as God would be one person, and Christ as man would be another, and there would be two persons and two Christs." [13] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 69): "In order to show this most complete unity of the person, those things which are properties, whether of the divine, or human, or both natures, are ascribed to the one hypostasis, or are designated by the concrete derived from -------------End of Page 323---------------------------------------- the divine, or from the human, or from both natures." (Id., 68): "Because the union of natures occurred in the hypostasis of the Word, so that there is now one and the same person of both natures subsisting at the same time in both natures, when the concrete terms derived from the divine nature, as God the logos, the Son of God, are predicated of the incarnate Christ, although the designation is derived from the divine nature, yet they signify not only the divine nature, but a person now subsisting in two natures, divine and human. And when the concrete terms de- rived from the human nature, as man and Son of man, are predi- cated of the incarnate Christ, they designate not a merely human nature, or a human nature alone, but an hypostasis, subsisting both in the divine and human nature, or which consists, at the same time, of both a divine and a human nature, and to which both natures belong. Hence it occurs that all the properties are correctly ascribed to concrete terms, denoting the person of Christ, whether named from both or only from one of the two natures." [14] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 67): "But it" (i.e., true faith) "does not, with Eutyches and the Monotheletes, confound that communication between the natures with a change and mixture both of natures and properties, so that humanity is said to be divinity, or the essential property of one nature becomes the sub- stantial property of the other nature, considered in the abstract, whether, on the one hand, beyond the union or in itself, or, on the other, by itself in the union. But a property belonging to one nature is imparted or ascribed to the person in the concrete." Hence HOLL. (696): "(1) The subject is not the abstract, but the concrete, of the nature or person." (It cannot, therefore, be said that Deity was crucified.) "(2) The predicate" (namely, that which is affirmed of the subject, i.e., of the incarnate (complex) person) "does not mark a divine or human substance itself, but a property of one of the two natures." GRH. (III, 485): "In this genus, are the abstract expressions to be employed, `Deity suffered, Divinity died?'" He adds, "that they have indeed been em- ployed by some with the limitation, `Divinity suffered in the flesh;'" but is of the opinion "that it would be better to abstain from this mode of expression;" and he proves this "(1) From the silence of Scripture. (2) From the nature of Deity. Deity is incapable of suffering, or of change, and interchange; therefore, suffering cannot be ascribed to it. Deity pertains to the entire Trinity;... but if, therefore, Deity in itself were said to have suffered, the entire Trinity would have suffered, and the error of the Sabellians and Patripassians would be reproduced in the --------------End of Page 324------------------------------------- Church.... (3) From the conndition of the union. Through the union, the distinction of natures has not been removed, but the hypostasis of the logos became the hypostasis of the flesh, so as to constitute one complex person; therefore, something can be predi- cated of the entire person, according to the human nature, and yet it by no means follows that the same should be ascribed to the divine nature. As works and sufferings belong to the person, and not to the nature, I am correct in saying, `God suffered in the flesh;' but I cannot say, `the divinity of the logos suffered in the flesh.'" [15] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 37): "BUt in this class of expressions it does not follow that those things which are ascribed to the whole person are, at the same time, properties of both na- tures, but it is to be distinctly declared according to which nature anything is ascribed to the entire person." CHMN. (de duab. nat., 69): "Yet, lest the natures may be thought to be mingled, from the example of Scripture there is gen- erally added a declaration to which nature a property belongs that is ascribed to the person, or, according to which nature of the per- son it is ascribed. For the properties of one nature do not hinder the presence also of the other nature with its properties. Nor do they hinder the properties of one nature from being ascribed to the person subsisting in both natures. Nor is it necessary that what, in this genus, is predicated of the person should be applicable to both natures. But it is sufficient that it pertain to the person according to one or the other nature, whether the divine or the human. QUEN. (III, 94): "Patticles used for this purpose are en, ex, dia, kata, 1 Pet. 2:24; 3:18; 4:1; Rom. 1:3; 9:5; Acts 20: 28." By this additional more specific statement, it is furthermore shown how the predicate, applied to the subject, properly belongs only to one of the two natures, although, by virtue of the union of persons, it belongs also to both natures. (HOLL. (696): "The mode of expression is true and peculiar by which divine or human properties are declared to belong to the entire theanthropic person (for the properties of humanity, because of the personal union, are truly and properly predicated of the Son of God, and vice versa), yet in such a way that, by means of discretive particles, they are claimed for the nature to which they formally belong, while they are appropriated by the other nature to which they belong, not formally, but because of the personal union.") The mode of ex- pression is illustrated by the following examples. (HOLL. (697): "The Son of God was born of the seed of David, according to the flesh, Rom. 1:3. The subject of this idiomatic proposition is the Son of God, by which the entire person of Christ, designated from --------------------End of Page 325------------------------------- the divine nature, is denoted. The predicate is, that He was born of the seed of David, which is a human property. This is predi- cated of the concrete of the divine nature, to which it does not by itself belong, but through something else, because of the unity of the theanthropic person; whence, by the restrictive particle, kata, `according to the flesh,' the human property of the human nature is asserted, to which a birth in time formally applies; yet the divine nature is not excluded or separated from the participation in the nativ- ity, inasmuch as the being born of the seed of David belongs to it by way of appropriation.") The proposition, "God suffered," is thus explained: "The Son of God suffered according to His human nature subsisting in the divine personality. As, therefore, when a wound is inflicted upon the flesh of Peter, not alone the flesh of Peter is said to have been wounded, but Peter, or the person of Peter, has been truly wounded, although his soul cannot be wounded; so, when the Son of God suffers, according to the flesh, the flesh or his human nature does not suffer alone, but the Son of God, or the person of the Son of God, truly suffers, although the divine nature is impassible." (Id., 698): "The sentence, `God has suffered,' is not then to be explained away with Zwingli into `The man, Jesus Christ, who at the same time is God, has suf- fered,' in which case the mode of expression would be no real and peculiar one." FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 39): "Zwingli names it an allaeosis when anything is ascribed to the divine nature of Christ, which, nevertheless, is a property of the human nature, and the reverse; For example, where it is said in Scrip- ture, Luke 24:28, `Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory?' there Zwingluy trifingly declares that the term Christ, in this passage, refers to His human nature. Be ware! beware! I say of that allaeosis;... for if I permit myself to be persuaded to believe that the human nature alone suffered for me, Christ will not be to me a Saviour of great worth, but He Himself stands in need of a Saviour."... QUEN. (III, 155): "They" (the Calvinists) "explain the designations of the first genus of communicatio idiomatum either with Zwingli by allaeosis, by which they state that the name of the person, or of one of the two natures, is put in the place of the subject only for the other nature which is expressed in the predicate; or with Piscator by synechdoche, of a part for the whole, i.e., that while the entire is put in the place of the subject, yet that it is in such a mnanner that the passion is restricted and limited to only a part of it, i.e., to the flesh alone. For example, they explain the proposition, `God suffered,' in this way: `Man alone, although united to God, suffered.'" ---------------------End of Page 326----------------------------------- [16] As appelations of this first genus the following were quoted, and their origin traced back to the old Church Fathers: antidosis, alternation, tropos antidoseos (Damascenus), enallage kai koinonia onomaton, exchange and participation of names (Theodoret), idiopoiia kai idiopoiesis appropriation (Cyril), alloiosis (but used in a different sense from that of Zwingli), oikeiosis, sunamphoterismos. Examples from Holy Scripture: Heb. 13:8; 1 Cor. 2:8; Acts 7:55; Ps. 24:7, 8; Acts 3:15; John 8:58. [17] GRH. (III, 499): "That which is communicated, the holy matter of communication, is the divine majesty, glory, and power, and on this account gifts truly infinite and divine." QUEN. (III, 102): "The foundation of this communication is the communication of the hypostasis, and of the divine nature of the logos. For, inasmuch as the human nature was taken into the union, and through the union became a partaker of the person and divine nature of the logos, it became truly and really a partaker of the divine properties; for these really do not differ from the divine essence." CHMN. (de duab. nat., 97): "If the dwelling of God in the saints by grace confers, in addition to and beyond natural endow- ments, many free divine gifts, and works many wonders in them, what impiety is it to be willing to acknowledge in the mass of human nature, in which the whole fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily, only physical endowments, and to be willing to believe of that nothing which surpasses and exceeds the natural condi- tions of human nature considered by or in itself, outside of the hypostatic union?" QUEN. (III, 158) concerning the nature of the mode: "We deny that this communication is merely verbal and nominal, as the Re- formed contend" (p. 160, "who altogether deny this second genus of communicatio idiomatum. The propositions: `The flesh of Christ quickens, the Son of man is omnipotent,' the Zwinglians explain by allaeosis thus: `The Son of God who assumed flesh, quickens,' etc."); "but we maintain that it is true, peculiar, and real. Yet we do not say that there is any transfusion of divine properties into the human nature of Christ (whereby the reproach of Eutychianism is repelled), or that there is any change of the human nature into the divine, or that there is an equalization or abolition of natures, but that there is a personal communication." [18] QUEN. (III, 101): "For the communication of majesty occured in that very moment in which the personal union oc- curred. For, from the very beginning of incarnation, the divine nature, with its entire fulness, united and communicated itself to -------------------End of Page 327-------------------------------- the assumed flesh." With reference to the subsequent doctrine of the states of Christ, QUEN. however still adds: "We must here dis- tinguish between the communication, with reference to possession, and the communication, with reference to use. So far as possession and the first act are concerned, the divine properties were commu- nicated to the human nature at one and the same time with the very moment or the very act of the union, and new ones have not been superadded. And although the second act, and the full use of the imparted majesty, were withheld during the state of humiliation, yet rays of omnipotence, omniscience, etc., frequently appeared, as often as seemed good to divine wisdom. But the full exercise of this majesty began not until His exaltation to the right hand of God." [19] QUEN. (III, 159): "Reciprocation, which has a place in the first genus, does not occur in this genus; for there cannot be a humiliation, emptying or lessening of the divine nature (tapeinosis, kenosis, elattosis), as there is an advancement or exaltation (beltiosis or huperupsosis) of human nature. The divine nature is unchange- able, and, therefore, cannot be perfected or diminished, exalted or depressed. The object of the reciprocation is a nature in want of and liable to a change, and such the divine nature is not. The promotion belongs to the nature that is assumed, not to the one that assumes it." THe ground on which only the properties of the divine nature are communicated to the human and not the reverse, arises from the mode of the act of union. BR. (472): "It amounts to this, that, as on the part of the nature, although the divine is personally united to the human, and the human to the divine, yet this distinction intervenes, that the divine nature inwardly pene- trates and perfects the human, but the human does not in turn penetrate and perfect the divine, but is penetrated and perfected by it; so in the communicatio idiomatum, this distinction intervenes, that the divine nature, penetrating the human, also makes the same, abstractly considered, in its own way, partaker of its divine perfections; but not so in turn the human nature, which neither permeates nor perfects the divine nature, and does not and cannot in a like manner render this, abstractly considered, the partaker of its own properties." [20] GRH. (III, 499): "We do not deny that, in addition to the essential properties of human nature, certain gifts pertaining to this condition inhere subjectively in Christ as a man, which although they surpass, by a great distance, the most excellent gifts of all men and angels, yet are and remain finite; but we add, that, in addition to these gits which pertain to the condition and are finite, gifts truly infinite and immeasurable have been imparted to Christ the -------------End of Page 328------------------------------------------ man, through the personal union, and His exaltation to the right hand of the Father." HOLL. (702): "Through and because of the personal union, there have been given to Christ, according to His human nature, gifts that are truly divine, uncreated, infinite, and immeasurable." And, although it may be said in general "all the divine attributes have been imparted to the flesh of Christ, still a distinction should be made between attributes anenergeta and energetika." As is well known, the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum forms a main point of difference between the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches. But of most significance is the diffrerence concerning this second genus of properties, since the doctrine set forth under this head is decisive in regard to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper; for here the discussion has special reference to the attribute of omnipresence. We give, therefore, in this place, first, a summary of the difference between the two churches, and then a more specific statement of the doctrine of omnipresence. COTTA (in GRH., Loci, IV, Diss., I, 50), in the first place, groups to- gether the points in reference to the doctrine of the person of Christ, on which both sides generally agree. "They agree (1) that in Christ there is only one person, but two natures, namely, a divine and a human; (2) that these two natures have been joined in the closest and most intimate union, which is generally called personal; (3) that by this union, a more intimate one than which cannot be conceived, the natures are neither mingled, as has been condemned in the Eutychians, nor the person divided, as has been condemned in the Nestorians; but (4) that this union must be regarded as without change, mixture, division, and interruption (atreptos, asungchutos, adiairetos, achoristos); and therefore (5) that by this union neither the difference of natures nor the peculiar conditions of either have been removed: for the human nature of Christ is always human, nor has it ever, by its own natural act, ceased to be finite, extended, circumscribed, passible; but the divine nature is and always remains infinite, immeasurable, impassible; (6) that nevertheless by the power of the personal union the proper- ties of both natures have become common to the person of Christ, so that the person of Christ, the God-man, possesses divine proper- ties, uses them, and is named by them; that in addition to this (7) by means of the hypostatic union there have been imparted to the human nature of Christ the very highest gifts of acquired con- dition (habitualia), for example, the greatest power, the highest wisdom, although finite; but that (8) to the mediatorial acts of Christ each nature contributed its own part, and that the divine -------------------End of Page 329----------------------------------- nature conferred upon the acts of the human nature infinite power to redeem and save the human race. In a word (9) that the inti- mate union of God and man in Christ is so wonderful and sublime that it surpasses, in the highest degree, the comprehension of our mind." But "they" (the Reformed) "differ from us when the question is stated concerning the impartation abstractly consid- ered, or of a nature to a nature; beccause they deny that, by the hypostatic union, the properties of the divine nature have been truly and really imparted to the human nature of Christ, and that, too, for common possession, use, and designation, so that the human nature of our Saviour is truly Omnipresent, Omnipotent, and Omniscient." The controversy betweeen the Lutherans and Reformed had mainly reference, therefore, to the possession and use of the divine attributes which were ascribed to the human nature of Christ; among these the following were made especially prominent, viz., omnipotence, omniscience (which He used, how- ever, in the state of humiliation, not always and everywhere, but freely, when and where it pleased Him), omnipresence, vivific power, and the worship of religious adoration, which also were ascribed to the humanity of Christ (so that the flesh of Christ should be worshiped and adored with the same adoration as that due to the divine nature of the logos). Among these attributes, however, none was more zealously controverted than that of omni- presence, because this was the chief point in dispute between the Lutherans and Reformed with regard to ta presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper. The chief objection against the real presence of Christ in the Holy Supper, Carlstadt, and after him Zwingli, had derived from the statement that Christ is sitting at the Right Hand of the Father, and therefore cannot be at the same time upon earth, in the elements of bread and wine. In opposition to this, Luther appealed to the personal union; from this, and the conse- quent communion of natures, he inferred the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ, and proved thereby the possibility of a real pres- ence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper. Thus the doctrine of the omnipresence, or, as the Reformed expressed it, the ubiquity of the flesh in Christ, became very important, and the Lutheran theologians are very accurate in its presentation. QUEN. thus states the question here at issue (III, 185): "Whether Christ, according to the humanity united with His divine and in- finite person, and exalted at the Right Hand of the divine majesty, in this glorious state of exaltation is present to all creatures in the universe with a true, real, substantial, and efficacious omnipres- ence?" From this question the others, viz., whether omnipresence -----------------End of Page 330----------------------------------- is to be ascribed to Christ, according to His divine nature, and whether it is to be at all ascribed to the person of Christ, are care- fully distinguished. The first follows, as a matter of course; and also in regard to the other question, both parties were agreed in this, namely, that "omnipresence is properly ascribed to the entire person, in the concrete, or in the divine person of Christ, in which human nature subsists, wherever it is; or, what is the same thing, that Christ is everywhere, by reason of His person." And, from the question stated above, they further distinguished the one with reference to the personal or intimate presence, which is mutual be- tween the logos and the flesh (by which the logos has the assumed nature most intimately present with itself, without regard to place, so that the logos never and nowhere is without or beyond His flesh, or this without or beyond Him, but, where you place the logos, there you also place the flesh, lest there be introduced a Nestorian disruption of the person subsisting of both natures). The contro- versy had rather to do with the outward presence, viz., that relat- ing to creatures, and the most of the Dogmaticians understood by this omnipresence, "the most near and powerful dominion of Christ in His human nature." Accordingly, the thesis of the Dogmaticians concerning the question is the following: "The majesty of the omnipresence of the logos was communicated to the human nature of Christ in the first moment of the personal union, in consequence of which, along with the divine nature, it is now omnipresent, in the state of exaltation, in a true, real, substantial, and efficacious presence. And so there is given to Christ, according to His human nature, a most near and powerful dominion, by which Christ as man, exalted at the Right Hand of God, preserves and governs all things in heaven and earth by the full use of His divine majesty." QUEN. (III, 185). "And, finally, it was protested that this omni- presence was not physical, diffusive, expansive, gross, local, cor- poreal, and divisible (as the Calvinists pretend that we hold), and it was described as majestatic, divine, spiritual, indivisible, which did not imply any locality, or inclusion, or expansion, or diffu- sion." (Id. III, 186.) And it was not thereby asserted that the body of Christ had lost its natural properties in such a manner that He had now ceased to be at any particular place. (HOLL. (712): "We must distinguish between a natural and personal act of the flesh of Christ. The flesh of Christ, by an act of nature, when Christ dwelt upon earth, was in a certain place, in the womb of His mother, upon the cross, etc., circumscribedly, or by way of occupy- ing it; and now also in the state of glory, in accordance with the manner of glorified bodies, it is in a certain celestial somewhere, -------------------End of Page 331------------------------------------ not circumscribedly, however, but definitively. But to this nat- ural act that personal act is not opposed, by which it is illocally in the logos, from which presence all local ideas or conceptions are to be abstracted.") To the proofs for the second genus of idiomata, the Dogmaticians add also, for the omnipresence especially, that derived from the sitting at the right hand of God. (HOLL. (714): "Christ rules with omnipresence according to the same nature according to which He sits at the right hand of God. But, accord- ing to His human nature, etc. Therefore, to sit at the Right Hand of God is explained by ruling. Just as, therefore, the Right Hand of God is everywhere and rules, for by this is designated in Holy Scripture the immense and infinite power and might of God, no- where excluded, nowhere inoperative; thus, to sit at the Right Hand of God is, in virtue of the exaltation, to rule everywhere with divine power, truly immeasurable, and this cannot be conceived of without omnipresence, for surely the divine dominion is not over the absent, but over the present.") The opposite statment of the Reformed was this: "Just as the body of Christ, while He moved upon earth, was not present in heaven, so now that same body, after the ascension, is not present on earth; and, exalted above the heavens, we believe it is held there." Their main arguments against the omnipresence were these: "Because thereby the reality of the body of Christ, of His death and ascension to heaven would be disproved, inasmuch as a true human nature cannot be extended infinitely; because He who is omnipresent cannot die; because He who is, by virtue of His omnipresence, already in heaven, cannot still ascend thither." To these objections HOLL. (718) answers: "1. The doctrine concerning the reality of the flesh of Christ is not overthrown by the ascription of omnipresence to it, for it is not omnipresent by a physical and extensive, but by a hyperphysical, divine, and illocal presence, which belongs to it not formally and per se, but by way of participation, and by virtue of the personal union. 2. The doctrine concerning the death of Christ is not over- turned by it, for the natural union of body and soul was indeed dissolved by death, but without disturbing the permanent hypo- static union of the divine and human natures. 3. The doctrine of the ascension of Christ is not disproved by it, for before the ascen- sion the flesh of Christ was present in heaven by an uninterrupted presence as a personal act, but He ascended visibly to heaven in a glorified body according to the divine economy (kat oikonomian), so that He might fill all things with the omnipresence of His domin- ion. For Christ, by virtue of His divine omnipotence, can make Himself present in various ways." ----------------------End of Page 332------------------------------- Notwithstanding these precise statements concerning the omni- presence of the flesh of Christ, there still was no uniform and, in all its features, settled doctrinal statement concerning it prevalent among the Lutheran Dogmaticians. The reason of this lies in the fact, that until the time of the FORM. CONC. the only aim had in view, in the development of this doctrine, was the practical one of showing through it the possibility of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper. So far as this was necessary, all the Lutheran Dogmaticians are agreed. But this is no longer the case to such an extent, when, without reference to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, they had to do merely with the dogmatic development of the doctrine of omnipresence. As, however, the Dogmaticians were led by the right tact, to attribute no great im- portance to a difference which led to no practical result, they had no controversy about it, and the different views stood unassailed alongside of each other. There was still room enough for different views. The question, e.g., could arise: 1. Whether the omni- presence of the flesh of Christ was to be conceived of as only one by virtue of which Christ, according to His human nature, could be omnipresent when and where He wished; or, as one by virtue of which, in consequence of the communicatio idiomatum, He was always, without exception, actually omnipresent from the state of exaltation onward, and only refrained from exercising this omni- presence, during the state of humiliation, in consequence of the mediatorial work He had undertaken? 2. How the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ should be defined; whether only as one by virtue of which the human nature participates in the dominion which is exercised by the divine nature; or as one by virtue of which it is present to all creatures in such a manner as Christ is present to them by virtue of His divine nature? In regard to these questions, the views of the Dogmaticians, already before the FORM. CONC., were not alike, and the FORM. itself is so variable in its utterances on this subject that a satifactory answer to the ques- tions above stated cannot be elicited from it. Hence it happens that later Dogmaticians of different views believed themselves authorized to appeal to the FORM. CONC. in vindication of their several opinions. After the completion of the FORM. CONC., there- fore, the Dogmaticians were divided in opiniion, about as follows, viz.: the majority mentioning the omnipresence only as "a most powerful and present dominion over creatures," either not entering at all upon the questions of the absolute presence, or rejecting that doctrine entirely. This omnipresence was then called also modi- fied omnipresence. Thus QUEN., BR., the latter of whom appeals ---------------------End of Page 333------------------------------ to the FORM. CONC. (475): "(They (the authors of the Form. Conc.) manifestly describe that omnipresence not as absolute, as a mere close proximity to all creatures and without any efficacious influence, but as modified, or joined with an efficacious influence, and according to the needs of the universal dominion which Christ exercises according to both His natures.") At the same time they assert that, from the time of the exaltation onward, Christ is to be regarded as constantly omnipresent according to His human nature, i.e., as always exercising the "most powerful dominion." Others, on the other hand, as the majority of the Swabian theologians, but beside these also, HOLL., asserted, that no only the "most power- ful dominion" belonged to the human nature of Christ from the time of the exaltation onward, but also the true presence, and the latter, indeed, from the time of the conception. A short-lived con- troversy arose at the time when the theologians of Helmstadt and Brunswick refused to accept the FORM. CONC., mainly because, as they asserted, a doctrine of the omnipresence was taught in it with which they could not coincide. They admitted, indeed, that Christ, according to His human nature, can be present where He will; but they maintained that He actually willed to be present only there where it has been expressly promised concerning Him, namely, in the Holy Supper and in the Church. Besides, they characterized this presence not as an effect of omnipresence, but of omnipotence. The omnipresence maintained by them they designated the relative omnipresence. This view (which Calixtus, also, at a later date, adopted) was opposed by both classses of Dogmaticians, mainly because they wished to have the possibility of the presence of Christ in the Holy Supper deduced from His omnipresence, and this from the communicatio idiomatum, without agreeing among themselves as to the mode of stating it. This point, therefore, has remained unsettled. Another question that arose was, concerning the time in which Christ, according to His human nature, assumed the ex- ercise of the divine majesty. Cf., on that subject, the topic of the "States of Christ." [21] Scriptural Proofs--Majesty is imparted to the human nature: Matt. 11:27; Luke 1:33; John 3:13; 6:62; Phil. 2:6; Heb. 2: 7. The sitting of Christ, the man, at the right hand of Majesty, Matt. 26:64; Mark 14:62; Luke 22:69; Rom. 8:34; Eph. 1:20; Heb. 7:26; 8:1. Omnipotence, Matt. 28:18; Phil. 3:21. Omniscience, Col. 1:19; 2:3, 9. Omnipresence, Matt. 18:20; 28;20; Eph. 1: 23; 4:10. Power to quicken, John 6:51; 1 Cor. 15:21, 45. Power to judge, Matt. 16:27; John 5:27; Acts 17:31. [22] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 46): "With respect to the ---------------------End of Page 334------------------------------- functions of Christ's office, the person does not act and operate in, or with one, or through one nature alone, but rather in, with, ac- cording to and through both natures; or, as the Council of Chalde- don declares, one nature effects and works, with impartation of the other, that which is peculiar to each. Therefore Christ is our Mediator, Redeemer, King, etc., not merely according to one nature, whether the divine or the human, but according to both natures." GRH. (III, 555): "The Son of God took upon Him- self human nature, for the purpose of performing in, with, and through it, the work of redemption, and the functions of the medi- atorial office, 1 John 3:8, etc. Hence in the works of His office, He acts not only as God, nor only as man, but as God-man; and, what is the same, the two natures in Christ, in the works of the office, do not act separately, but conjointly. From unity of person follows unity in official act." HOLL. (726): "The remote basis of this impartation is unity of person, and the intimate communion of the divine nature in Christ. The proximate basis is the commu- nicatio idiomatum of the first and second genus." [23] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 85): "When one nature in Christ does that which is peculiar to it, or, when Christ does anything, according to the property of one nature, in that action or suffering the other nature is not unemployed, so as to do either nothing or something else; but, what is a peculiarity of the one nature is effected and performed in Christ with impartation of the other nature, that difference being observed which is peculiar to each. Therefore, when Christ, according to His human nature, suffers and dies, this also occurs with impartation to the other nature, not so that the divine nature in Him also suffers and dies, for this is peculiar to the human nature, but because the divine nature of Christ is personally present with the nature suffering, and wills the suffering of its human nature, does not avert it, but permits its humanity to suffer and die, strengthens and sustains it so that it can bear the immense weight of the sin of the world and of the entire wrath of God, and renders these sufferings precious to God and saving to the world." [24] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 85): "Because the offices and bless- ings of Christ as Saviour are such that, in many or most of them, the human nature in Christ cannot co-operate with its natural or essential properties or operations alone, numberless attributes huperphusika kai paraphusika [supernatural and extraordinary] were deliv- ered and imparted to the human nature from its hypostatic union with divinity." HOLL. (726): "The mode of impartation and mutual confluence --------------------------End of Page 335--------------------------- consists in this, that the divine nature of the logos not only performs divine works, but also truly and really appropriates to itself the actions of the assumed flesh; but the human nature, in the office of the Mediator, acts, not only according to its natural strength, but also according to the divine power which it has communicated to it from the personal union." QUEN. (III, 106): "I say that by means of His person, He appropriates to Himself actions and sufferings of humanity, for it must not be said the divine nature sheds blood, suffers, dies, just as it is said that the human nature quickens, works miracles, governs all things, but God sheds His blood, suffers, dies." [25] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 86): "The testimonies of Scripture clearly show that the union of the two natures in Christ occured in order that the work of redemption, atonement, and salvation might be accomplished in, with, and through both natures of Christ. For if redemption, atonement, etc., could have been accomplished by the divine nature alone, or by the human nature alone, the logos would have in vain descended from Heaven for us men, and for our salvation, and become incarnate man." GRH. (III, 556): "The human nature indeed could have suffered, died, shed its blood. But the sufferings and bloody death of Christ would have been without a saving result, if the divine nature had not added a price of infinite value to those sufferings and that death, which the Saviour endured for us." Accordingly, the work of redemption, as well as every individual action of Christ, is considered as one in which both natures in Christ participate. The technical term for this is apotelesma ("a common work, resulting form a communica- tive and intimate confluence of natures, where the operations of both natures concur to produce this, or the work is divinely-human, because both natures here act unitedly." QUEN. (III, 105)). Yet as each individual action proceeds, first of all, from one of the two natures, namely, from that one to whose original properties it belongs, the technical term for this is energema (`a result peculiar to one nature'). Thus, the shedding of Christ's blood is an operation of the human nature, for only the human nature has shed blood; the infinite merit which belongs to this blood is an operation of the divine nature. But the atonement for our sins, which has been wrought by means of the shed blood only in view of the fact that both natures have contributed their part thereto, the human nature by shedding it, and the divine nature by giving to the blood its infinite merit, is the work (apotelesma) of both natures. HOLL. (728) further describes the apotelesmata of Christ, as of a twofold order. "The divine nature of the logos cannot effect some things except by ------------------------End of Page 336---------------------------- a union with flesh (for example, suffering as a satisfaction, a life- giving death); other things, from His free good pleasure or purpose, He does not will to effect without flesh (for example, miracles)." [26] BR. (478): "The third genus of communicatio idiomatum consists in this, that actions pertaining to the office of Christ do not belong to a nature singly and alone; but they are common to both, inasmuch as each contributes to them that which is its own, and thus each acts with the communication of the other." QUEN. (III, 209): "The antithesis of the Calvinists, who (1) deny that the communication of the apotelesmata or of official actions can be referred to the communicatio idiomatum....(2) who teach that both natures act their parts by themselves alone, each without participation of the other, and thus that the human nature of Christ is the works of the office only performs human works from its own natural properties, but must altogether be ex- cluded from divine actions.... (3) who affirm that the flesh of Christ contributed to the miracles only as a mere and passive (aergon) instrument." [27] CHMN. (de duab. nat.): "This union of the kingship and priesthood of Messiah was made for the work of redemption, for the sake of us and our salvation. But as redemption had to be made by means of suffering and death, there was need of a human nature. And it pleased God that, for our comfort, in the offices of the kingship, priesthood, and lordship of Christ, our assumed nature should also be employed, and thus the acts (apotelesmata) of Christ's offices should be accomplisehd in, with, and through both." [28] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 81): "For let not exactness be re- garded as idle, just as also accurate care in speaking. But let the question, What is the true use of this doctrine? be always in sight. For thus we will be the more inclined to cultivate care in speaking properly, and will be the more easily able to avoid falling into logomachies and quibbles." ... B.--OF THE OFFICE OF CHRIST. PARA. 34. The Threefold Office of Christ.* The doctrine of the Person of Christ is followed by that of the Work that He performed; for to accomplish this was the ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *GRH. was the first to treat of this entire doctrine under a separate head; before his day it was discussed in connection with other doctrines, usually under the head of Justification; and the form, too, in which the doctrine is now set forth, -----------------End of Page 337----------------------------------------------- very design of His incarnation. This Work is the redemption of the human race. CONF. AUG., III: "They teach, that the Word, i.e., the Son of God, assumed human nature... that He might reconcile the Father to us and become a sacrifice, not only for original sin, but also for all the actual sins of men." To ac- complish this work of redemption was the work assigned to Christ upon earth, and the undertaking that He assumed. We designate it as His mediatorial work, and understand by it all that Christ did to effect a redemption, and all that He is still doing to make it available to men. "The mediatorial office is the function, belonging to the whole person of the God-man, origi- nating theanthropic actions, by which function Christ, in, with, and through both natures, [1] perfectly executed, and is even now ac- complishing, by way of acquisition and application, all things that are necessary for our salvation." QUEN. (III, 212) [2] This work Christ undertook in its whole extent, i.e. (1) While upon earth, He Himself announces to men the divine purpose of re- demption, and provides that after His departure it shall be further announced to men. (2) He Himself accomplishes the redemption, by paying the ransom through which our recon- ciliation with God is effected. (3) After His departure He preserves, increases, guides, and protects the Church of the Redeemed thus established. As these three functions corres- pond to those of the Old Testament prophets, priests, and kings, the mediatorial office of Christ is accordingly divided into the Prophetic, Sacerdotal, and Regal offices. [3] [1] The Dogmaticians say here, expressly, that Christ is Medi- ator according to both natures, as would indeed naturally and properly follow from the topic just discussed. Erroneous opinions upon this subject, that arose even in the bosom of the Evangelical Church itself, furnished the occasion of giving prominence to it, and so we see the FORM. CONC. already denouncing existing errors upon this subject (Epit., Art. III, 2 sq.: Concerning the righteous- ness of faith before God): "For one side (Osiander) thought that -------------------------------------------------------------------- appears for the first time complete (though in brief outlines) in GRH. MEL. is the first to use the expression, Kingdom of Christ; he does this, however, in the doctrine of the resurrection. STRIGEL then annexed the Priesthood of Christ, which afterwards was developed into the sacerdotal and prophetic offices. We cannot ignore the fact, that this topic has failed to receive anything like as thorough a discussion and development as many others. ---------------End of Page 338----------------------------------------- Christ is our righteousness only according to the divine nature .... In opposition to this opinion, some others (Stancar, the Papists) asserted that Christ is our righteouness before God only according to the human nature. To refute both errors, we believe ... that Christ is truly our righteousness, but yet neither accord- ing to His divine nature alone, nor according to His human nature alone, but the whole Christ, according to both natures." ... QUEN. (III, 212): "For both natures concur for the mediatorial office, not by being mingled, but distinctly and with the properties of both remaining unimpaired, and yet not separately, but each with impartation of the other." [2] GRH. (III, 576): "The office of Christ consists in the work of mediation between God and man, which is the end of incarna- tion, 1 Tim. 2:5." HOLL. (729): "If the mediatorial office of Christ be taken in a narrower sense, it seems to coincide with His sacerdotal office, 1 Tim. 2:5, 6. Yet this does not prevent us from receiving it in a wider sense, so as to embrace His office as prophet and king. For Moses, the prophet, is likewise called mediator and it escapes the observation of no one that kings not unfrequently bear the part of mediators." [3] GRH. (III, 576): "The office of Christ is ordinarily stated as threefold, that of a prophet, a priest, and a king; yet this can be reduced to two members" (thus Hutter), "so that the office of Christ is stated as twofold, that of a priest and of a king. For the priest's office is not ony to sacrifice, pray, intercede, and bless, but also to teach, which is a work that they refer to His office as a prophet." QUEN. (III, 212): "Yet, by most, the tripartite dis- tinction is retained." "THe appropriateness of this distribution is proved according to GRH. (ib.): (1) From the co-ordination of Scripture passages. It is correct to ascribe just as many parts to the office of Christ, as there are classes to which those designations can be referred which are ascribed to Christ with respect to His office, and passages of Scripture which speak of the office of Christ. But now there are three classes to which the designations which are ascribed to Christ, with respect to office, can be referred. There- fore, etc. (2) From the enumeration of the benefits coming from Christ. Christ atones before God for the guilt of our sins... which is a work peculiar to a priest. Christ publishes to us God's counsel concerning our redemption and salvation, which is the work of a prophet. Christ efficaciously applies to us the benefit of redemption and salvation, and rules us by the sceptre of His Word and Holy Ghost, which is the work of a king." ... ------------------------End of Page 339---------------------------------- PARA. 35. The Prophetic Office. By the Prophetic Office we understand the work of Christ, in so far as He proclaims to men the divine purpose of redemp- tion, and urges them to accept the offered salvation. [1] This work Christ performed as long as He was upon the earth; He thereby acted as a prophet, for it was the business of prophets to teach and to declare the will of God; [2] and, in conse- quence of the greater dignity and power that belonged to Him as the God-man, He performed this work in a much more per- fect and effective manner than all the prophets that preceded Him. [3] But this did not cease with His departure from the earth; on the other hand, by the establishment of the sacred office of the ministry, Christ made provision that this work should still be performed, and that, too, with the same effi- ciency as before, inasmuch as He imparted to the Word and the Sacraments, the dispensation of which constitutes the work of the ministry, the same indwelling power and efficiency that belong to Himself by virtue of His divine nature; and thus, in them and through them, He is still effectively working since His departure. [4] His prophetic office is, therefore, to be regarded as one still perpetuated, and